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Abstract
Are preferential trade agreements (PTAs) stumbling blocks or building blocks towards
multilateral trade liberalization? We address this question by investigating the eﬀects
of the negotiation and implementation of PTAs on the use of antidumping (AD) (i.e.,
the most common form of contingent trade protection) by member countries against
non-members, as there has been a concurrent surge in regionalism and AD activity since
the 1990s. Theoretically-derived empirical predictions are supported by the empirical
analysis based on the 15 most intense users of AD. The results demonstrate that both
the negotiation and the implementation of PTAs lead to fewer AD measures against
non-member countries, except for members of customs-union agreements in force facing
large import surges from non-members. Thus, our results highlight a building-block
eﬀect of PTAs on multilateral trade cooperation when it comes to AD protection.
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1 Introduction
The world has witnessed an astounding proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs)
since the early 1990s. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), as of January 2018,
the number of notified active PTAs stands at 284, with all WTO members being members of
at least one PTA in force.1 And this figure is in fact likely to increase in the near future as
many WTO members are currently involved in negotiations for new PTAs. The sheer number
of such agreements has generated a large body of literature, started by Bhagwati (1991), an-
alyzing whether PTAs are “building blocks” or “stumbling blocks” towards multilateral trade
liberalization, which would be the first-best policy.2 A second major trend that has dominated
international commercial policy over the same period is the dramatic increase in antidumping
(AD) activity. Although the stated objective of AD is to eliminate the injurious eﬀect of
dumping (i.e., exporting a product at less than fair value), its application has nothing to do
with maintaining a “fair” trading environment. AD “is simply a modern form of protection”
(Blonigen and Prusa, 2003), which is nowadays used on a regular basis by a large number of
developed and developing countries.3
Since AD measures can provide governments with a flexible trade policy instrument at a
time when WTO commitments severely constrain the use of most-favored-nation (MFN) tar-
iﬀs, it is natural to ask whether the building- or stumbling-block eﬀect of PTAs might manifest
itself (also) through the use of such measures. This natural question has not received much
attention in the literature so far, although in his recent survey article on PTAs, Limão (2016)
does point out that the interdependence of PTAs and non-tariﬀ barriers against non-member
countries is an important area for future research. This is the objective of this empirical paper,
which aims to shed light on the ramifications of PTAs for their member countries’ extra-PTA
AD activity (i.e., the AD activity of PTA members against non-members).
A number of theoretical contributions have looked at whether PTAs help or hinder multi-
lateral trade liberalization. However, the theoretical literature on this question remains largely
1See http://rtais.wto.org/UI/charts.aspx.
2See Freund and Ornelas (2010) and Limão (2016) for a survey of the literature on PTAs.
3Economists would agree that AD is justified in the case of predatory dumping, the objective of which
is to drive out domestic producers from the home market for exporters to gain a dominant position in it,
resulting in subsequent price increases. However, such predatory motives are absent in most AD cases, and
the introduction of AD measures does not hinge upon them.
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inconclusive, as the answer depends on the modeling assumptions. This makes the empirical
investigation of this issue all the more relevant. To guide our empirical strategy on the re-
lationship between PTAs and AD, we rely on the theoretical work by Tabakis (2010, 2015).
These papers explore the implications of the (symmetric) formation of, respectively, customs
unions (CUs) and free-trade areas (FTAs) for contingent protection. Both papers employ a dy-
namic game of trade-policy setting, in which countries are limited to cooperative multilateral
agreements that are self-enforcing–as is common in the literature–and the economic envi-
ronment is characterized by exogenous trade-volume volatility. Restricting our attention to
AD measures, which is the focus of our paper, three testable predictions emerge from Tabakis
(2010, 2015): (i) the number of AD measures of members against non-members of an FTA
agreement should decrease both during its negotiation and after its implementation; (ii) the
number of AD measures of members against non-members of a CU agreement should decrease
during its negotiation; and (iii) the number of AD measures of members against non-members
of a CU agreement should increase following its implementation for “high” import volumes
from non-member countries, whereas the reverse is true for “low” volumes of imports.
To empirically test these predictions, we carry out an extensive data collection process
as we gather detailed data for a large number of PTAs. In particular, the testing of our
predictions requires information on the dates of the launch of negotiations for the diﬀerent
PTAs in our sample and of their entry into force. Using then AD data over the period
1980—2015 and diﬀerent econometric strategies, our results do provide clear support to the
aforementioned theoretical predictions. Both the negotiation and the implementation of PTAs
have a significant eﬀect on the extent of AD use of PTA members vis-à-vis non-member
countries. What is more important, PTAs generally have a dampening eﬀect on their members’
AD activity against the rest of the world, except when members of an implemented CU
agreement face substantial import growth from non-member countries, which is in line with
the theoretical predictions of Tabakis (2010). In brief, our results suggest that with one
notable exception (i.e., CUs in force facing a substantial growth of extra-CU imports), PTAs
are building blocks towards multilateral trade cooperation as far as AD protection is concerned.
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature on the ramifications of PTAs for multilat-
eral trade liberalization, while focusing on non-tariﬀ barriers. Some studies provide evidence
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in support of a building-block eﬀect of PTAs (e.g., Estevadeordal et al., 2008), whereas others
oﬀer evidence showing that PTAs are stumbling blocks towards tariﬀ liberalization at the
multilateral level (e.g., Limão, 2006; Karacaovali and Limão, 2008). The paper by Estevade-
ordal et al. (2008), which also makes a distinction between FTAs and CUs, is probably the
closest to ours (at least) as far as results are concerned. Their findings suggest that FTAs
produce a building-block eﬀect, while CUs lead to a considerably smaller reduction, if at all, in
MFN tariﬀs than FTAs, which is very much in line with our findings. Our work complements
these (and other) papers by highlighting that AD (i.e., the most important non-tariﬀ barrier)
represents a diﬀerent channel through which PTAs aﬀect multilateral trade cooperation. In
other words, we demonstrate that in order to get a more thorough picture regarding the im-
plications of regionalism for the multilateral trading system, other policy instruments besides
MFN tariﬀs should be taken into consideration.
In relation to the interplay specifically between PTAs and AD use, only three papers (to
the best of our knowledge) examine the empirical eﬀects of PTAs on AD. Ahn and Shin (2011)
look at the eﬀects of FTAs on the intra-FTA AD filings of major AD users over 1995—2009, and
find that FTAs inversely aﬀect AD investigations within the boundary of FTA membership.
In comparison, Silberberger and Stender (forthcoming) explore the impact of PTAs on the use
of bilateral AD measures over the period 1991—2014, while explicitly considering the degree
of intra-block tariﬀ liberalization. They find that PTAs generally reduce the likelihood of AD
activity among PTA members, but an improvement in the relative tariﬀ treatment among
fellow integration partners leads to a higher likelihood of bilateral AD activity than an equal
improvement among non-integration trading partners. Finally, Prusa and Teh (2010), which
is the paper closest in spirit to ours, investigate the ramifications of PTAs for both intra-
PTA AD filings and AD filings against non-member countries. They find that AD provisions
in PTAs decrease the incidence of intra-PTA AD cases, but increase the number of filings
against non-member countries. Postponing the discussion on the discrepancy between the
latter result and our findings, it is important to stress at this point that our paper diﬀers from
these previous studies in two major respects. First, we distinguish between the negotiation
and the implementation phases of PTAs. Second, we distinguish between FTAs and CUs. As
the theoretical models by Tabakis (2010, 2015) suggest and our empirical analysis verifies,
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both distinctions are critical in order to get deeper insights into the ramifications of PTAs for
AD protection.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a non-technical
presentation of the theoretical framework that can be used to model the issues under inves-
tigation. The empirical predictions that follow from this framework and how they can be
econometrically tested are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 is dedicated to the description
of the data, with an emphasis on the extensive data collection undertaken to systematically
record the history of formation (i.e., initiation of process, launch of negotiations, conclusion
of negotiations, signature, ratification, and entry into force) of the PTAs in our sample. The
empirical results are discussed in Section 5, together with a quantification of their implications
for the use of AD and several robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
The main goal of this paper is to empirically examine the impact of PTAs on their members’
extra-PTA AD activity (i.e., the AD activity of PTAmembers against non-member countries),
thus shedding light on whether PTAs are building blocks or stumbling blocks towards mul-
tilateral trade liberalization. To this end, we rely on the theoretical work by Tabakis (2010,
2015) to derive testable predictions. Tabakis (2010) looks at the ramifications of symmetric
CU formation for multilateral trade cooperation, while the companion paper, Tabakis (2015),
focuses on FTAs.
The analysis in both papers rests on three main assumptions. First, as is common in the
literature on trade agreements, countries are limited to self-enforcing multilateral agreements
(i.e., agreements that balance for each country its short-term terms-of-trade gains from de-
fection from the agreed-upon policies against the long-term welfare losses due to its trade
partners’ retaliation).4 Second, the economic environment is characterized by exogenous
trade-volume volatility. As a result, “special” protection (or contingent protection–the two
terms will be used interchangeably below) becomes an indispensable on-equilibrium-path safety
4See Bagwell and Staiger (2002) for an in-depth analysis of enforcement issues within the context of the
GATT/WTO.
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valve, allowing countries to maintain multilateral cooperation amid volatile trade swings.
More specifically, a trade agreement should allow countries to temporarily raise their cooper-
ative level of protection–via using special protection–when facing significant import-volume
surges so that their incentive to defect is kept in check and multilateral cooperation does not
break down.5 Third, as in Bagwell and Staiger (1997a, b), the countries’ trading relationship
passes through three phases: an initial or pre-PTA-negotiations phase, a transition or PTA-
negotiations phase with diﬀerent PTAs being concurrently negotiated, and a final phase in
which the PTAs in question are in force. In practice, the establishment of an FTA or CU
entails a lengthy period over which an agreement is initially negotiated, subsequently ratified
by all the member countries, and finally gradually implemented.6 In the earlier stages of this
process, member and non-member countries face changes primarily with respect to expected
future trade patterns rather than current ones, which implies that the relationship between
regionalism and multilateral trade cooperation is non-stationary. Modeling therefore explicitly
the PTA-negotiations phase is essential for a complete analysis of the ramifications of PTAs
for the multilateral trading system over time.
Tabakis (2010) demonstrates, in the context of a competing-importers model, that the
parallel initiation of diﬀerent CU negotiations leads to an easing of multilateral trade ten-
sions, especially with respect to the employment of special protection. Intuitively, this stems
from the market-power eﬀect of CU establishment due to the harmonization of the member
countries’ external trade policies. In particular, a CU, relative to any of its member states
taken individually, enjoys more substantial market power (i.e., a greater ability to aﬀect world
prices) and can, therefore, credibly threaten to punish more harshly any deviation from the
cooperative course.7 As a result, as countries enter (symmetrically) into CU talks and the
establishment of diﬀerent CUs becomes (more) likely, the expected discounted value of future
multilateral cooperation increases. At the same time, countries’ static gains from defection
from the cooperative agreement remain unaﬀected as they are only a function of current trade
5See the seminal work by Bagwell and Staiger (1990) for further elaboration on this result. Bown and
Crowley (2013) provide empirical evidence in support of this theoretical prediction.
6For the PTAs in force included in our benchmark analysis, almost 10 years passed on average between the
launch of their negotiation and their entry into force.
7For empirical evidence that terms-of-trade or market-power considerations do play a significant role in
trade policy formulation, see Broda et al. (2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (2011).
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patterns, upon which the mere initiation of CU talks has no eﬀect. Thus, in comparison with
the pre-CU-negotiations period, a more liberal multilateral trading environment is now fea-
sible as countries are less inclined to revert to protectionist strategies, violating multilateral
cooperation.
This beneficial eﬀect of CU formation on multilateral cooperation is, however, temporary.
Once the negotiations are over and the CU agreements come into force, countries’ static in-
centive to deviate from the cooperative path also intensifies, and thereby, a more protectionist
trading environment resurfaces.8 The reason is that the CUs can more eﬀectively manipulate
the terms of trade to their advantage than can any of their member countries when viewed in
isolation. An important finding that emerges from the analysis of Tabakis (2010) is that in
comparison with the pre-CU world (i.e., a world where there are no CU negotiations in the
near horizon), the employment of contingent protection in the post-CU world is more severe
for “high” import volumes, but is less frequent overall in the sense that a higher import-volume
surge is required to warrant its use (on the equilibrium path).
These theoretical results are illustrated in Figure 1, which depicts the most cooperative
level of protection (b ) than can be sustained multilaterally (i.e., between countries not part
of the same CU in force) as a function of the free-trade import volume, which is subject to
exogenous shocks. Notice that  refers to the critical import-volume threshold in a given
period above which the employment of contingent protection becomes necessary so that mul-
tilateral cooperation does not break down. Considering the various phases the countries’
trading relationship passes through, b 1 represents the (most cooperative) equilibrium trade-
protection function in the pre-CU world, while b 2 refers to the corresponding one during the
CU-negotiations phase. As b 2 is to the right of and parallel to the original curve, this implies
that above the threshold 1, the same level of imports will induce lower protectionist pres-
sures (i.e., less contingent protection) once countries enter into CU talks. However, once the
diﬀerent CUs are implemented, the b  curve shifts to the left and becomes steeper (see b 3).
Therefore, as compared with the pre-CU world, less (more) protectionist trade policies will be
8See Krugman (1991) for an early analysis of how CU formation might lead to a less liberal multilat-
eral trading environment (in a non-cooperative setting). The major divergence of Tabakis (2010) from the
(large) literature on the impact of CUs on the multilateral trading system is that he explicitly examines their
ramifications for contingent protection.
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implemented at the multilateral level in the post-CU world for low (high) import volumes.
In his follow-up paper, Tabakis (2015) explores the implications of FTA agreements for
special protection in the context of a model similar to the aforementioned one. He shows
that the parallel formation of diﬀerent FTAs leads to a gradual but permanent easing of
trade tensions at the multilateral level, especially with regard to the use of special-protection
instruments such as AD measures. The intuition underlying this finding is straightforward.
The FTA agreements induce trade diversion, lowering the volume of trade between FTA
partners and non-partner countries. This has a dampening eﬀect on countries’ static incentive
to defect from the cooperative course, allowing for a less protectionist international trading
environment to come forth.9 In fact, a relatively liberal environment can be maintained
also during the FTA negotiations, as the prospective emergence of diﬀerent FTAs with the
accompanying reduction in multilateral trade barriers raises the expected discounted value of
future cooperation, while leaving the short-term terms-of-trade gains from increased protection
unaﬀected (as FTA negotiations have no eﬀect on the existing trade patterns).
Again, these theoretical results can be illustrated in the same way as in the CU case. Figure
2 shows such a graphical representation of the results, where the b  curves are analogous to
the ones in Figure 1. As in the CU scenario, b 2 lies to the right of b 1, but b 3 is now farther to
the right and flatter than both b 1 and b 2. Thus, there is a gradual but continuous easing of
protectionist pressures as countries negotiate and then implement diﬀerent FTA agreements.
3 Empirical Predictions and Methodology
The theoretical framework described in the previous section leads to a number of testable
predictions regarding the implications of the negotiation and implementation of PTAs for the
use of contingent trade instruments. Among those that qualify as such, AD measures are the
ones that are being used the most extensively around the world as they are relatively easy
to administer, and a case for their introduction is not that diﬃcult to meet the necessary
9A number of papers have demonstrated in diﬀerent settings that FTA agreements might induce–after
their implementation–their member countries to lower their tariﬀs vis-à-vis non-members (e.g., see Bagwell
and Staiger, 1999; Bond et al., 2004; Ornelas, 2005). None of these papers though shares the focus of Tabakis
(2015) on the implications of FTAs for contingent protection (rather, they restrict their attention to MFN
tariﬀs).
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legal conditions. Countervailing duties and safeguards also fall in this category, but they are
not used as extensively because of the more stringent conditions that must be fulfilled for
introducing such measures. For example, Bown and Crowley (2016, Table 5) report several
statistics related to the share of diﬀerent countries’ imports covered by contingent measures
over the period 1995—2013. Their statistics demonstrate that AD is the favoured instrument
and when countervailing duties and safeguards are used, they are often applied to the same
products also targeted by AD. Moreover, among the countries included in our econometric
analysis, it is only for China, the EU, Indonesia, Turkey, and the United States that other
instruments besides AD have had a meaningful impact on trade, but even in these cases, only
for some short time periods (see Table 5 and Figure 10 in Bown and Crowley, 2016).
Thinking of ADmeasures as the instrument of contingent protection, the theoretical models
by Tabakis (2010, 2015) lead to the following testable predictions:
1. The number of AD measures of members against non-members of an FTA agreement
should decrease both during its negotiation and after its implementation;
2. The number of ADmeasures of members against non-members of a CU agreement should
decrease during its negotiation;
3. The number of AD measures of members against non-members of a CU agreement
should decrease (increase) following its implementation for low (high) import volumes
from non-member countries.
In order to assess these predictions, we proceed in two steps. First, we evaluate whether the
negotiation and the implementation of PTAs aﬀect the use of AD measures by PTA members
against non-member countries, without distinguishing between FTAs and CUs. This serves
as a preliminary stage to find out whether there is any prima facie evidence in the data of the
eﬀects that should manifest themselves as a result of the establishment of PTAs. Notice that a
lack of evidence on PTA implementation aﬀecting AD use may be due to the opposite eﬀects
that FTA and CU agreements might produce once implemented (as a function of member
countries’ import volume from non-member countries). On the other hand, the negotiation of
PTAs is unambiguously expected to have a negative impact on their (prospective) members’
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extra-PTA AD activity since during the negotiation of either an FTA or a CU agreement,
the negotiating countries should engage in less AD activity against the rest of the world as
compared with the pre-negotiations period. In the second step, the three predictions are
individually tested by considering the diﬀerential eﬀects of FTA and CU agreements on the
employment of AD protection, especially after their entry into force.
In both steps, the dependent variable () is the count of new AD measures imposed
by country  against country  in year . Given that the dependent variable is a non-negative
integer, we employ a negative binomial estimator for all of our regressions.10 The basic
specification we estimate in the first step is
 = 1  + 2 +
3− + 4− + 5− +  +  +  + , (1)
where   and   are our regressors of interest. 
 is the count of PTAs that country  is negotiating with any country  6= 
at time , while   counts the number of implemented PTAs (i.e., PTAs
in force) between countries  and  6=  in year  (out of those that have entered into force
during the sample period). Notice that the important feature of these variables is that they
measure the involvement of country  in PTAs not including the trade partner , as the focus
of our analysis is on the eﬀect of PTAs on AD use between their members and non-member
countries. In terms of other variables, we control for the level of bilateral imports of country 
from country , their growth, and the bilateral real exchange rate (all part of −), as well
as for the GDP growth of importing country  (−) and exporting country  (−).11 Year
fixed eﬀects (i.e., ) are always included, while  and  represent separate importer and
exporter fixed eﬀects; alternatively,  and  are replaced in some specifications by country-
pair (i.e., dyad) fixed eﬀects. Standard errors are always clustered at the country-pair level,
although we discuss alternative possibilities in the robustness section.
In the second step of the econometric analysis, we distinguish the eﬀects of the negotiation
and the implementation of FTAs from the corresponding eﬀects associated with CU forma-
10Compared with the Poisson estimator that assumes that the mean and the variance of the dependent
variable are the same, the negative binomial allows for overdispersion (i.e., a larger variance), which is what
we observe in our data.
11The subscript  indicates diﬀerent lags of the regressors.
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tion. Thus, our key regressors are four in those estimations:  , 
,  ,  . Furthermore, the specification
must allow for diﬀerential eﬀects between FTA and CU agreements following their implemen-
tation as a function of the import volume of member countries from non-members. Thus, the
implementation regressors need to be interacted with  −1 to verify whether
the data confirm that extra-CU AD activity may actually increase as a result of the imple-
mentation of a successfully negotiated CU agreement and a surge in CU members’ imports
from non-member countries.
The possible eﬀects of the negotiation and implementation of PTAs on their members’
extra-PTA AD activity are identified through diﬀerent variation in the data, depending on
whether importer and exporter or dyad fixed eﬀects are used. The use of country-pair fixed
eﬀects makes for the most demanding specification, as any time-invariant country-pair hetero-
geneity is absorbed by the dyad fixed eﬀects, and any significance of the coeﬃcients of interest
stems from variation within the country pairs due to the diﬀerent PTAs in which the import-
ing countries are involved over time (in terms of negotiation and implementation). If this
is the cleanest identification method in controlling for any unobservable (non-time-varying)
country-pair AD determinant, the non-linear nature of the estimator forces us to drop any
country pair (, ) for which it is the case that not a single AD measure has been introduced
by the importing country  against the trade partner  during the sample period. Some of
these country pairs should be dropped from the estimation because they are such that AD
measures are highly unlikely (e.g., very small exporting country). However, country pairs may
be excluded when a zero for AD measures is a “true” zero: AD measures happen to be zero
but they could have occurred. Using separate importer and exporter fixed eﬀects represents
an alternative identification strategy, which does not exclude these observations. In this case,
only importing countries that have used AD at some point during the sample period (against
any trade partner) are included, but this is not a limitation since we do want to restrict the
analysis to active and intense users of AD.
When including dyad fixed eﬀects, these eﬀects are estimated instead of relying on a
conditional fixed-eﬀects estimator. In the latter case, a conditional likelihood function is
used so that the eﬀects are “conditioned out” of the likelihood function and do not need
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to be estimated. Thus, this estimator is not equivalent to what is usually thought of as a
fixed-eﬀects estimator (i.e., there are no diﬀerent intercepts). In fact, the coeﬃcients of time-
invariant variables can be identified in conditional fixed-eﬀects estimations. On the other hand,
the inclusion and estimation of dyad fixed eﬀects may give rise to inconsistent estimates due
to the incidental parameter problem in short panels. However, Allison and Waterman (2002)
demonstrate that no such bias emerges.12
Before moving to discussing the data and the results, a few observations are in order. First
of all, our key regressors (i.e., the ones related to negotiation and implementation of PTAs by
importer ) only take into consideration PTAs aﬀecting at least a minimum level of country
’s imports in the year before their entry into force, or if not yet in force by the end of our
sample period, in the year before the launch of their negotiation. As a matter of fact, we can
reasonably expect that the mechanisms discussed in Section 2 are at play only if a PTA aﬀects
a significant amount of member countries’ trade, else the trade-diversion and market-power
eﬀects underlying the economic forces at work would not manifest themselves. Theory is silent
on what “significant” actually means in practice. In the benchmark regressions, we assume
this import-share threshold to be 10%, but we discuss the sensitivity of our results to the
chosen threshold in the robustness section.13
In terms of the sample, we do not include country pairs that are partners to a PTA in
force or are involved in the negotiation of one. In fact, our focus is on verifying whether PTAs
have an eﬀect on the use of AD measures by their members against non-member countries
while being negotiated and after entering into force. Our empirical analysis thereby focuses
on a comparison of AD patterns between members of PTAs and non-members before versus
after the negotiation and the implementation of the PTAs in question, not on a comparison
of AD patterns within PTAs vis-à-vis AD patterns between PTA members and non-member
countries (although we revisit this choice in the section on robustness checks).14
12In addition, for some country pairs, our sample covers a period of 36 years (see Table A2 in the Appendix).
13As expected, the eﬀects become less precisely estimated when using lower thresholds.
14We exclude any pair of countries that are members of the same PTA in force as recorded by de Sousa
(2012). In the case of a country pair (, ) negotiating a PTA, we exclude it if the share of imports of country
 aﬀected by the trade agreement is at least 1%.
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4 Data
In order to implement the econometric strategy discussed in the previous section, three sets of
data are needed. Comprehensive details on the history of formation of existing PTAs are the
first cornerstone and the data that proved the most diﬃcult to collect. Data on the use of AD
are required to construct the dependent variable, while trade and macro variables constitute
the final set of data. In the following, we discuss each of these datasets in turn.
Regarding PTAs, our full sample includes all agreements notified to the GATT/WTO that
satisfy all of the following three conditions: (i) they have entered into force from 1980 (i.e.,
the first year of our sample period) onwards and were still active by the end of 2015 (i.e.,
the last year of our sample period), or they were not yet in force by the end of the sample
period but their negotiation has been announced “early” to the WTO; (ii) they involve at least
one of the 15 most intense users of AD (to be defined below); and (iii) they aﬀect, for their
member countries identified by condition (ii), at least 1% of their imports in the year before
entering into force, or for PTAs still under negotiation by the end of 2015, in the year before
the launch of their negotiation. For these PTAs, we carried out an extensive data collection
process since no single source (e.g., Dür et al., 2014) provides complete details on the history
of formation of the existing PTAs. In particular, for each PTA in our sample, we gathered
the dates of the initiation of the PTA formation process (e.g., the launch of a joint feasibility
study or the expression of intention to explore the possibility of a PTA), the (announcement
of the) launch of negotiations, the actual start of negotiations (i.e., the beginning of the first
round of formal negotiations), the formal conclusion of negotiations, the signature of the
agreement, the ratification of the agreement, and the entry into force of the agreement, with
our empirical analysis focusing on the launch of negotiations for the diﬀerent PTAs and their
entry into force.15 The information comes from a wide range of online sources, including (but
not limited to) the WTO, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Oﬃce of
the United States Trade Representative, the Foreign Trade Information System (SICE) of the
15In some cases (e.g., the EU—South Africa Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement) an agreement
is provisionally applied before it fully enters into force. For these agreements, we use in our empirical analysis
the date of provisional application rather than the date of entry into force, as the provisional application of a
PTA already has important ramifications for the trading relationship between its members and non-member
countries (e.g., in terms of trade diversion).
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Organization of American States, the Asia Regional Integration Center (ARIC) of the Asian
Development Bank, partner countries’ oﬃcial sources (e.g., the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs
of South Korea or the Ministry of Commerce of China), or national legislative bodies (for
ratification dates). As a last resort, we also used historical data from quality newspapers.
Using 10% as the import-share threshold in condition (iii) above in order to choose which
PTAs to include in our benchmark analysis, we end up with 24 PTAs for the construction of
our key regressors related to negotiation and implementation of PTAs by importer  (see Table
A1 in the Appendix for the full list). Out of these 24 PTAs, four are classified as still under
negotiation based on their status at the end of the sample period, while only four are CUs.
It is important to notice here that one given PTA may be counted for more than one of the
importing countries included in the analysis depending on members’ intra-PTA import share.
For example, NAFTA is counted for all three member countries–i.e., Canada, Mexico, and
the United States–but the CU between the EU and Turkey is counted only for Turkey due
to EU imports from Turkey in 1995 (i.e., the year before entry into force of the agreement)
representing less that 10% of the EU’s total imports. Moreover, it should be stressed here
that there are few CUs in the sample which, if anything, may make it harder to identify the
CU eﬀects predicted by our theoretical framework.
Data on the worldwide usage of AD (since 1980) come mainly from the Global Antidumping
Database (Bown, 2015) and are complemented by data from Moore and Zanardi (2009) for
some countries and years.16 In particular, these sources allow us to construct the dependent
variable, , as the count of AD measures introduced by an importer  against an exporter
 in year . Since we would expect the PTA eﬀects on the use of AD to occur only for those
countries that do make systematic use of this form of contingent protection, we limit the sample
of importing countries to those using intensely this policy instrument. Table 1 provides several
summary statistics on the worldwide use of AD (i.e., initiations and measures) over our sample
period, which runs from 1980 until 2015 with a later starting year for importing countries
that have implemented an AD law more recently (see Table A2 in the Appendix for details
on included years by country). In order to select which countries to include in our sample
16For the sample used in the econometric analysis, only the data for Canada before 1995, the EU before
1987 and New Zealand before 1995 are taken from Moore and Zanardi (2009).
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of importers, we consider the cumulative number and annual average of AD investigations
and applied measures (e.g., duties, price undertakings) by country.17 The summary statistics
reported in Table 1 confirm previous findings in the literature in terms of the countries that
are the most intense users of this instrument. Based on the table, we include in our sample
of importing countries the five usual traditional users of AD (i.e., Australia, Canada, the EU,
New Zealand, and the United States) and the ten most active new users: Argentina, Brazil,
China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey. We choose to
include New Zealand among them because, although its numbers of initiations and measures
per year over our entire sample period are not very large, it was a heavy AD user in the 1980s
(a period which is included in our analysis); and in a robustness check, we drop it.18
As for the import data (at the aggregate bilateral level), they are taken from the IMF
Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) and they serve two purposes. First, we need to control
for the size of imports from a given trade partner and their growth as they are both known
determinants of AD measures against the country in question. Not less importantly, one of
the empirical predictions emerging from Tabakis (2010) is that the eﬀect of CU agreements
once implemented on the AD usage of their members against non-member countries depends
on the members’ import volume from the latter. Hence, interacting import growth (between
 and  − 1) with the PTA implementation variables is key in distinguishing the impact of
FTAs from CUs on their members’ extra-PTA AD activity.
Finally, macro controls comprising the (log of the) bilateral real exchange rate (with a
1-year lag) and importer and exporter GDP growth rates (between  and − 3) are included
as they have been shown to aﬀect the introduction of AD measures (e.g., see the seminal work
by Knetter and Prusa, 2003). In fact, the lag structure we employ for the macro controls is
identical to the one of Knetter and Prusa (2003). Our macro variables are taken from the
World Development Indicators (WDI).
Merging these three sets of data, the sample consists of 15 importing countries and all
of their trade partners as exporters over the period 1980—2015. Notice though that starting
17Initiations and measures per year are based on the number of years for which a country has had an AD
law in force during the sample period 1980—2015.
18We do not include Taiwan in our sample of importers, even though it has initiated several investigations,
because of its very low success rate for the introduction of measures (i.e., 234% versus 561% for the entire
set of AD users and 571% for the chosen 15 importers), which we use as our dependent variable.
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from the consideration of all potential trade partners of the 15 importing countries identified
above, import and macro data are missing in many cases, and therefore, the inclusion of
the associated regressors forces us to drop many observations. For the observations included
in the set of regressions with all the controls, the summary statistics of our variables are
reported in Table 2. It is clear that AD measures are not very common, even though they
are very important policywise (and the  average doubles in the sample used in the
regressions with dyad fixed eﬀects, consisting of country pairs with at least one AD measure).
In terms of the key regressors of interest, the maximum number of either simultaneous PTA
negotiations or simultaneous PTA implementations is 5, which is reached in both cases by
Indonesia because it is part of the agreements involving ASEAN (see Table A1). Moreover,
the summary statistics of our FTA and CU regressors clearly illustrate that there are few CUs
in our sample (especially under negotiation), which could make it diﬃcult to uncover in the
data the theoretical results discussed in Section 2.
5 Empirical Results
The results of the first step of our estimation strategy are presented in Table 3. In this
case, we do not distinguish between FTAs and CUs in their eﬀects on the use of AD by
their members against the rest of the world. Still, it should be the case that higher values
of   lead to fewer extra-PTA AD measures (i.e., the eﬀects of FTA and
CU agreements during their negotiation are the same). In addition, the estimated coeﬃcient
for   should also be negative, except if the eﬀect from members of CUs
facing high import growth from non-member countries dominates.
Table 3 includes eight specifications that diﬀer because of fixed eﬀects, of whether control
variables are included or not, and of the functional form of   and 
 (in logs in the last four columns). Even before discussing the diﬀerences
between these modeling strategies, it is obvious that the results are quite robust: the negotia-
tion and the implementation of PTAs between an importing country  and any country  6= 
in year  both reduce the number of AD measures that country  introduces against trading
partner  in the same year. All but one of the relevant coeﬃcients are statically significant
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at the 1% level and they are larger (in absolute terms) for implemented PTAs than for PTAs
under negotiation. Thus, it is the case that the data provide broad support for the theoretical
predictions discussed in Section 2. In graphical terms, the negative coeﬃcients for 
 represent the downward shift in the b  curve between phases 1 and 2 in both
Figures 1 and 2, since as diﬀerent PTA negotiations are launched, countries’ expected value of
future multilateral trade cooperation increases, while their static incentive to defect from the
cooperative course remains unaﬀected. Regarding the coeﬃcients for  ,
Figures 1 and 2 highlight an important diﬀerence between FTA and CU agreements following
their implementation that we will address in the following table (i.e., Table 4).
Looking in detail at the results in Table 3, the first specification includes only year, importer
and exporter fixed eﬀects together with the key regressors of interest. It is clearly the case
that this minimalist version should be augmented by the inclusion of the trade and macro
controls that the literature has shown to be important determinants of AD activity. Although
their inclusion in column (2) forces us to drop many observations due to missing data, it is
reassuring to see that reducing the sample size has minimal eﬀects on the estimated coeﬃcients.
As far as the control variables are concerned, their coeﬃcients are in line with what we expect
from previous studies: the estimated coeﬃcients for import volume and import growth are
positive (although the latter is not statistically significant), as is the case for the coeﬃcient
of the bilateral real exchange rate (while importer and exporter GDP growth rates are not
statistically significant).19 Columns (3) and (4) are analogous to the first two columns, but
they are based on specifications including dyad fixed eﬀects. This strategy entails a significant
loss of observations also for the minimalist specification (i.e., any country pair (, ) for which
it is the case that not a single AD measure has been introduced by the importing country
 against the trade partner  during the sample period is dropped), resulting in a smaller
drop in observations when the controls are included. Still, the results are very similar to the
previous ones: there are no significant diﬀerences between the estimates in columns (2) and
(4).
The last remaining four columns re-estimate the same specifications with the key regressors
19Notice that a higher value of the bilateral real exchange rate variable corresponds to an appreciation of
the real exchange rate of the importing country.
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  and   replaced by the log of one plus these count
variables. This alternative formulation imposes a non-linear eﬀect of the negotiation and
implementation of PTAs on their members’ extra-PTA AD activity and the results confirm
this to be the case. Furthermore, the reduction in the sample size in columns (6) and (8) due
to the inclusion of the control variables does not change our qualitative conclusions.
The dual purpose of Table 3 was to establish prima facie evidence of the eﬀects predicted
by our theoretical framework and to dispel any concern of sample selection bias due to the
unavailability of the trade and macro controls. The latter is crucial as we move to the second
step of our analysis, where the inclusion of import growth is essential in order to test the
empirical predictions in all of their details. The results of the second step are reported in
Table 4, which does not include any minimalist specification since import growth is more than
just a control variable and cannot be excluded. Columns (1) and (3) employ year, importer
and exporter fixed eﬀects, while columns (2) and (4) use year and dyad fixed eﬀects. As
for the functional form of the count of PTAs under negotiation and in force, in the last two
columns we use their log version.
The results in Table 4 demonstrate that the negotiation of PTAs reduces (prospective)
members’ extra-PTA AD activity with a stronger (in terms of significance and magnitude)
dampening eﬀect for CU agreements. As far as PTAs in force are concerned, FTAs have a
negative eﬀect on the employment of AD protection independently of the growth of extra-FTA
imports. The implementation of CU agreements has an overall negative impact too on their
members’ AD activity against the rest of the world, but the interaction term with import
growth is positive and significant across all specifications, which indicates that this beneficial
eﬀect of CU establishment (from a cooperative perspective) may be overturned when CU
members face suﬃciently large import surges from non-member countries. This last result is
consistent with the empirical predictions derived from Tabakis (2010) and especially with the
slope of the b 3 curve in Figure 1. As for the other regressors, their coeﬃcients’ significance
is very much in line with the results of Table 3. Notice that some of the coeﬃcients are
imprecisely estimated when using the log version of the key regressors in the last two columns.
As a matter of fact, regarding CUs, there may not be enough variation in the data to uncover
a non-linear eﬀect for their implementation given that most of our PTAs take the form of
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FTAs and   takes at most the value of 2.20
Notice that these results seem to be at odds with the findings of Prusa and Teh (2010)
who showed that PTAs tend to increase the incidence of AD filings by PTA members against
non-member countries. However, a comparison between the PTAs included in our analysis
and those included in theirs reveals a very limited overlap, which also implies that the sam-
ple of importing countries used in their analysis is quite diﬀerent from ours. This important
observation together with a diﬀerent econometric methodology can explain the apparent con-
tradiction between the two studies. Interestingly, the aforementioned eﬀect of PTAs against
non-members seems to hold only when considering the subset of PTAs with AD rules regu-
lating intra-PTA AD activity (e.g., see their Table 7).
In conclusion, the estimates of Tables 3 and 4 provide clear support for the theoretical
predictions discussed in Section 2, suggesting that PTAs mostly constitute a building block
towards further multilateral trade liberalization. In particular, the negotiation and the im-
plementation of PTAs both have an eﬀect on the extent of AD use by PTA members against
non-member countries. The more interesting part is that in both cases, the mechanisms at
play (underlain by the market-power and trade-diversion eﬀects of PTAs) induce a lower extra-
PTA AD activity, except when members of CUs in force face substantial import growth from
non-member countries. And this diﬀerential eﬀect between FTAs and CUs on the multilateral
trading system is very much in line with the evidence provided by Estevadeordal et al. (2008).
5.1 Quantification of Eﬀects
Given the non-linear nature of the estimator, the estimated coeﬃcients do not allow for a
quantifiable interpretation of the impact of our key regressors on AD patterns. To facilitate
such an analysis, we report in Tables 5 and 6 the predicted counts of AD measures based on
our estimations, focusing on the specifications including dyad fixed eﬀects, which are the most
demanding in identifying the ramifications of PTAs for AD.
For the specifications in columns (4) and (8) of Table 3, Table 5 reports the predicted
20The significance of the coeﬃcients of the key regressors would improve if we were to exclude Indonesia as
an importing country. Indonesia is the country with both the most negotiations and the most implementations
of FTAs–5 in both cases–because of its membership in ASEAN (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
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counts of AD measures when an importing country is not involved in either the negotiation
or the implementation of any PTA versus when an importing country is involved in the ne-
gotiation and/or implementation of one PTA.21 Clearly, AD is a relatively rare phenomenon
(as already seen in the summary statistics in Table 2) even when restricting the sample to
country pairs with at least one AD measure during the sample period (i.e., when including
dyad fixed eﬀects): the estimates predict fewer than one AD measure when there is no PTA
either under negotiation or in force (i.e., 0470 or 0441, depending on the specification). The
relevant question, though, is what happens to these country pairs when an importing country
is involved in the negotiation and/or implementation of a PTA. The predicted count of AD
measures then drops significantly: based on column (1) of Table 5, one PTA under negotiation
(implemented) reduces the count of AD measures by 25% (34%), with an overall reduction
of 50% for importing countries simultaneously negotiating and implementing PTAs.22 The
magnitudes in column (2), based on the specification with the log version of our main regres-
sors, are quite similar in size (implying a 23%, 33%, and 49% drop in the predicted count of
AD measures, correspondingly).23 These changes in the predicted count of AD measures by
importer  against exporter  are quite large, but we must keep in mind that they are based
on PTAs that aﬀect at least 10% of the import volume of the importing country in question.
Table 6 reports similar calculations for columns (2) and (4) of Table 4 where we distinguish
between FTA and CU agreements and also include interaction terms between the implemen-
tation regressors and import growth. As a result, Table 6 is more cumbersome to read as
the eﬀect of implemented FTA or CU agreements must be evaluated at diﬀerent values of
import growth. Still, the picture that emerges from Table 6 is qualitatively similar to the one
from Table 5: the negotiation and the implementation of FTA and CU agreements all have
a significant impact on the number of extra-PTA AD measures that their members intro-
duce, with the dampening eﬀect for implemented CU agreements being mitigated when CU
21Similar counts can be computed for more than one PTA under negotiation and/or in force, but they would
not add much to the interpretation of the results.
22The estimated counts within each column of Table 5 are statistically diﬀerent from one another except for
the second and third counts for each specification (i.e., the eﬀects of being involved in the negotiation or the
implementation of one PTA are not statistically diﬀerent from each other).
23The two specifications would give rise to more significantly diﬀerent counts if we were to compute counts
for more than one PTA under negotiation and/or in force, as in that case the log transformation would play
a bigger role.
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members face large import surges from non-member countries. Focusing without loss of gen-
erality on column (1), all the predicted counts associated with FTAs are statistically diﬀerent
from one another (at least at the 5% level), except for the counts calculated for the same
FTA-involvement status but at diﬀerent percentiles of import growth. In other words, and
as predicted by the theory, the implementation of an FTA agreement has a negative eﬀect on
members’ extra-FTA AD activity, and this eﬀect does not depend on extra-FTA imports (i.e.,
0249 is not statistically diﬀerent from 0264, and in the same way, 0214 is not statistically
diﬀerent from 0226). Considering CUs, their negotiation significantly reduces the predicted
count of AD measures (it drops from 0359 to 0183), but import growth does matter when
it comes to quantifying the eﬀects of implemented CU agreements. For example, one imple-
mented CU agreement along with low import growth from non-members lead to fewer AD
measures against them than no implemented CU agreement at all (i.e., 0359 is statistically
diﬀerent from 0249), but there is no discernible eﬀect when CU members’ import growth from
non-members is high (i.e., 0359 is not statistically diﬀerent from 0287). Thus, in the latter
case, the building-block eﬀect of CUs is eliminated, but still there is no evidence of CUs being
stumbling blocks towards further multilateral trade liberalization. The estimated counts in
column (2) provide a very similar picture.
In conclusion, it is not only the estimated coeﬃcients that provide evidence in support of
the theoretical predictions discussed in Section 2. The quantification exercise demonstrates
that the building-block eﬀect of PTAs is sizable but can disappear in the case of implemented
CU agreements and large (enough) surges of extra-CU imports.
5.2 Robustness Checks
Tables 3 and 4 already include various robustness checks and demonstrate that our results
are robust to diﬀerent modeling choices. They address the issue of sample selection due to
data availability, they rely on diﬀerent econometric strategies (i.e., sets of fixed eﬀects), and
they consider diﬀerent functional forms for the count variables related to the negotiation and
implementation of PTAs. However, all the results presented so far are based on PTAs that
aﬀect at least 10% of the import volume of the importing country under consideration (in the
year before entering into force, or in the year before the launch of negotiations for agreements
20
not yet in force by the end of 2015). The choice of a threshold of 10% is based on the interest
to consider PTAs that can be expected to have meaningful trade eﬀects that would aﬀect their
members’ gains from multilateral cooperation and defection from the cooperative course. Still,
the 10% threshold is simply assumed and we need to verify whether the results are sensitive
to our threshold choice.
Thus, we re-estimate our specifications using a threshold of 5%. In such case, we would
expect the results to become weaker in terms of economic significance and probably less
statistically significant as “smaller” PTAs are now included.24 Table 7 presents the results
of such an exercise, only reporting estimates based on the use of dyad fixed eﬀects, as their
inclusion leads to the most demanding of the specifications. The first two columns parallel
columns (4) and (8) of Table 3, with the second column employing the log version of the
PTA count variables; the remaining two columns mirror columns (2) and (4) of Table 4,
again with the linear and non-linear formulation of the key regressors. Overall, the results
are very much in line with our previous conclusions although the main regressors of interest
sometimes present smaller coeﬃcients (in absolute terms) and/or lower levels of significance
(while the coeﬃcients for the control variables do not present any substantial change). The
only significant change is that the coeﬃcient for   is not significant even
when employing the linear version of the variable.25
Furthermore, an alternative way to capture the importance trade-wise of the diﬀerent PTAs
for their members would be to use as regressors the shares of trade aﬀected by the negotiation
and implementation of PTAs. In that case, we would not have to choose a threshold at all,
but diﬀerent complications would arise. On a methodological front, we may be concerned that
such shares are endogenous to the use of AD. On a conceptual front, enlargements of the EU
create problems since we consider the EU as a “country” and do not count its internal trade,
which poses diﬃculties for the trade-share calculations once an EU enlargement agreement is
implemented.26 For these reasons, such an exercise proves very problematic. Still, if we were
24With a 5% threshold, 12 more PTAs, of which one is a CU, are used to compute our main regressors of
interest.
25If we were to reduce the threshold even further to 1%, the estimated coeﬃcients of the key regressors
would also be smaller (in absolute terms) and somewhat less significant but the main qualitative results would
survive. The only major diﬀerence compared with Table 7 would be that the coeﬃcient for the interaction of
implemented FTAs and import growth would be positive and statistically significant in column (4).
26For example, EU trade with Poland is included in the total trade of the EU during the enlargement
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to ignore the endogeneity problem and drop the EU from the sample of importing countries,
the results would be qualitatively in line with what we have presented so far: the higher
the shares of trade aﬀected by the negotiation and the implementation of PTAs, the fewer
extra-PTA AD measures an importing country introduces.27
In another methodological check, we re-estimate our results without excluding the country
pairs that are partners to a PTA in force or are negotiating one. At the end of Section 3,
we argued that these observations should be excluded since the focus of the paper lies on
examining the eﬀect of PTAs on their members’ extra-PTA AD activity, in order to ascertain
whether PTAs constitute a building block or a stumbling block towards further multilateral
trade liberalization. In addition, the theoretical models by Tabakis (2010, 2015) only lead to
empirical predictions on the pattern of AD between PTA members and non-member coun-
tries. Still, we can include the observations so far discarded, remaining agnostic on how the
negotiation and the implementation of PTAs aﬀect their members’ intra-PTA AD activity.
Table 8 presents the same type of specifications as in Table 7 with these extra observations
(almost 3 000) and dummy variables that control for country pairs that are members of the
same PTA ( ) or are negotiating a PTA ( ). The results
show that the conclusions we reached earlier are overall still valid (although the results are
weaker for the negotiation of FTAs and the implementation of CUs). Moreover, our results are
consistent with the findings of Prusa and Teh (2010), Ahn and Shin (2011), and Silberberger
and Stender (forthcoming) that PTAs have a dampening eﬀect on the AD activity between
their member countries. Instead, the estimated coeﬃcient for   is never
significant.
We can also experiment by changing the set of importing countries included in the analy-
sis.28 We start by dropping New Zealand as it was a heavy user of AD in the 1980s, but
has ever since dramatically decreased the use of AD measures. Excluding New Zealand as an
importer does not aﬀect any of our qualitative conclusions. Considering the predominant role
that India and China have been playing recently when it comes to AD, it is reassuring that
negotiations. Once Poland becomes though a member of the EU, its trade flows with the other EU countries
are not counted as part of EU trade.
27Considering the limitations of this exercise, we do not report these results, but they are available upon
request.
28These robustness checks are omitted to save on space but are available upon request.
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our results are qualitatively unchanged as well when we drop them from the list of importing
countries.
In a final set of methodological checks (not reported to save on space), we first drop
year fixed eﬀects and replace our importer or dyad fixed eﬀects with the interaction of such
fixed eﬀects and a trend (i.e., we allow for importer or dyad-specific trend fixed eﬀects).
Such a change would address the concern that countries have become overall more open to
trade over time, translating in both an increase in the negotiation and implementation of
PTAs and a reduction in the use of AD. Once again, our qualitative results are unchanged
by the use of these diﬀerent fixed eﬀects. Finally, we have also tried clustering standard
errors at the importer—year level, in consideration of the fact that the number of PTAs under
negotiation and in force varies only by importer and year. Even though the standard errors
increase, the statistical significance of our key regressors is almost unchanged except for 
 in the first two columns of Table 4 that loses its significance.29
6 Conclusions
This paper has empirically explored the implications of PTAs for their member countries’
extra-PTA AD actions (i.e., the AD measures of members against non-member countries). In
so doing, it contributes to the long literature examining whether PTAs are building blocks
or stumbling blocks on the road to further multilateral trade liberalization. To guide the
econometric analysis, we have relied on the theoretical work by Tabakis (2010, 2015). Three
main testable predictions regarding PTAs and AD measures emerge from these papers: (i)
the number of AD measures of members against non-members of an FTA agreement should
decrease both during its negotiation and after its implementation; (ii) the number of AD
measures of members against non-members of a CU agreement should decrease during its
negotiation; and (iii) the number of AD measures of members against non-members of a
CU agreement should increase following its implementation for “high” import volumes from
non-member countries, whereas the reverse is true for “low” volumes of imports.
29Clustering the standard errors at the importer level only would instead lead to few clusters (15 in to-
tal), contradicting the assumption behind theory that the number of clusters should go to infinity (usually
interpreted as a minimum of 50 in state—year panels; see Cameron and Miller, 2015).
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To empirically test these predictions, we have first constructed a dataset containing ex-
tensive information regarding the negotiation, signature, ratification, and implementation of
a large number of PTAs. The novel dataset that we have created allows us to distinguish
between the negotiation and the implementation phases of PTAs. Using then AD data over
the period 1980—2015 and diﬀerent econometric strategies, we have provided clear evidence in
support of the aforementioned predictions. PTAs have, in general, a dampening eﬀect on their
member countries’ AD activity against the rest of the world (i.e., they produce a building-block
eﬀect), except when members of an implemented CU agreement face large import surges from
non-member countries. In such case, the building-block eﬀect may disappear albeit without
the (clear) emergence instead of a stumbling-block eﬀect. These results provide a new piece of
evidence on the (mostly) positive eﬀects of PTAs on multilateral trade cooperation, at least
as far as AD protection is concerned, and the diﬀerential eﬀect we uncover between FTA and
CU agreements on the multilateral trading system is very much in line with the results of
Estevadeordal et al. (2008). Finally, the findings of our paper are particularly important in
light of the fact that non-tariﬀ barriers have nowadays gained prominence relative to MFN
tariﬀs, which have dramatically decreased in recent decades because of WTO commitments.
And among non-tariﬀ barriers, AD is the most flexible and widely employed trade policy
instrument.30
In conclusion, this paper oﬀers yet further evidence that strategic interactions–either
across countries or between a given country’s policies–play a pivotal role in trade policy for-
mulation (see, e.g., Bown and Crowley, 2007; Tabakis and Zanardi, 2017). In particular, we
have demonstrated that a country’s decision to engage in regionalism has important ramifica-
tions for its AD activity vis-à-vis the rest of the world. What is more significant, our analysis
highlights the importance of taking into consideration other policy instruments besides MFN
tariﬀs in order to get a more comprehensive picture regarding whether PTAs are building
blocks or stumbling blocks towards multilateral trade cooperation.
30Notice that our results are not contradicted by the fact that the worldwide caseload of AD measures has
been growing over the last decades. This increase is the result of, among other things, an increasing level of
international trade. However, our results indicate that we would have seen even more AD measures worldwide
had it not been for the PTAs that have been negotiated and implemented.
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Table 1: Summary statistics on worldwide AD use 
Initiations Initiations per year Measures Measures per year 
USA 1,343 USA 37.31 European Union 643 India 23.25 
European Union 1,056 India 31.83 USA 614 European Union 17.86 
India 764 European Union 29.33 India 558 USA 17.06 
Canada 577 Australia 21.30 Canada 350 Canada 9.72 
Australia 575 Brazil 16.07 Argentina 252 China 9.58 
Brazil 450 Canada 16.03 Brazil 247 Argentina 9.33 
Argentina 380 Argentina 14.07 Turkey 214 Brazil 8.82 
South Africa 306 South Africa 13.30 Australia 204 Turkey 7.93 
Mexico 285 China 12.21 China 182 Australia 7.56 
Turkey 285 Turkey 10.56 South Africa 171 South Africa 7.43 
China 232 Mexico 9.83 Mexico 158 Mexico 5.45 
South Korea 166 Pakistan 6.71 South Korea 93 Vietnam 4.00 
Taiwan 141 Indonesia 6.35 Peru 63 Pakistan 3.64 
Indonesia 127 South Korea 5.53 Indonesia 61 Lithuania 3.50 
Peru 115 Peru 4.79 New Zealand 56 South Korea 3.10 
New Zealand 109 Taiwan 4.55 Egypt 53 Indonesia 3.05 
Colombia 101 Egypt 4.47 Pakistan 51 Egypt 2.79 
Pakistan 94 Colombia 4.04 Thailand 47 Russia 2.73 
Egypt 85 Malaysia 4.00 Colombia 44 Peru 2.63 
Malaysia 84 Sweden 4.00 Malaysia 43 Thailand 2.35 
Israel 68 Vietnam 4.00 Russia 41 Malaysia 2.05 
Thailand 68 Russia 3.53 Taiwan 33 Singapore 2.00 
Russia 53 Latvia 3.50 Ukraine 28 Ukraine 1.87 
Ukraine 37 Lithuania 3.50 Israel 25 Colombia 1.76 
Philippines 29 New Zealand 3.41 Venezuela 16 New Zealand 1.75 
Chile 28 Thailand 3.40 Philippines 13 Venezuela 1.60 
Venezuela 27 Honduras 3.00 Chile 9 Kazakhstan 1.33 
Japan 14 Israel 2.72 Finland 9 Poland 1.29 
Finland 13 Venezuela 2.70 Japan 9 Taiwan 1.06 
Poland 12 Ukraine 2.47 Poland 9 Israel 1.00 
Trinidad and 
 
12 Kazakhstan 2.33 Lithuania 7 Finland 0.75 
Austria 11 Singapore 2.00 Morocco 7 Morocco 0.70 
Costa Rica 11 Poland 1.71 Trinidad and 
 
7 Philippines 0.62 
Morocco 9 Czech Republic 1.50 Jamaica 4 Czech Republic 0.50 
Sweden 8 Nicaragua 1.50 Kazakhstan 4 Dominican Republic 0.50 
Uruguay 8 Philippines 1.38 Vietnam 4 Latvia 0.50 
Kazakhstan 7 Chile 1.33 Costa Rica 3 Nicaragua 0.50 
Latvia 7 Finland 1.08 Austria 2 Chile 0.43 
Lithuania 7 Bulgaria 1.00 Dominican Republic 2 Trinidad and 
 
0.37 
Jamaica 6 GCC 1.00 Ecuador 2 Jamaica 0.36 
Panama 6 Jordan 1.00 Paraguay 2 Japan 0.36 
Ecuador 5 Norway 1.00 Singapore 2 Paraguay 0.33 
Vietnam 4 Slovenia 1.00 Uruguay 2 Austria 0.15 
Czech Republic 3 Morocco 0.90 Czech Republic 1 Ecuador 0.15 
Dominican Republic 3 Austria 0.85 Guatemala 1 Costa Rica 0.15 
Honduras 3 Dominican Republic 0.75 Latvia 1 Uruguay 0.11 
Nicaragua 3 Trinidad and 
 
0.63 Nicaragua 1 Guatemala 0.05 
Guatemala 2 Japan 0.56 Bulgaria 0 Bulgaria 0.00 
Paraguay 2 Costa Rica 0.55 GCC 0 GCC 0.00 
Singapore 2 Jamaica 0.55 Honduras 0 Honduras 0.00 
Bulgaria 1 Panama 0.50 Jordan 0 Jordan 0.00 
GCC 1 Uruguay 0.42 Norway 0 Norway 0.00 
Jordan 1 Ecuador 0.38 Panama 0 Panama 0.00 
Norway 1 Paraguay 0.33 Slovenia 0 Slovenia 0.00 
Slovenia 1 Guatemala 0.11 Sweden 0 Sweden 0.00 
 7,748    4,348   
Notes: Countries in bold and italics are included in the econometric analysis. GCC stands for the six Middle Eastern 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Average St. Dev. Min Max 
ADi,j,t 18,243 0.151 0.672 0 14 
PTAs negotiationi,k,t 18,243 0.367 0.679 0 5 
PTAs implementedi,k,t 18,243 0.765 0.938 0 5 
ln(1+ PTAs negotiationi,k,t) 18,243 0.228 0.377 0 1.792 
ln(1+ PTAs implementedi,k,t) 18,243 0.449 0.474 0 1.792 
FTAs negotiationi,k,t 18,243 0.301 0.663 0 5 
CUs negotiationi,k,t 18,243 0.065 0.247 0 1 
ln(1+ FTAs negotiationi,k,t) 18,243 0.183 0.360 0 1.792 
ln(1+ CUs negotiationi,k,t) 18,243 0.045 0.171 0 0.693 
FTAs implementedi,k,t 18,243 0.558 0.956 0 5 
CUs implementedi,k,t 18,243 0.207 0.444 0 2 
ln(1+ FTAs implementedi,k,t) 18,243 0.310 0.476 0 1.792 
ln(1+ CUs implementedi,k,t) 18,243 0.139 0.290 0 1.098 
Import growthi,j,t/t-1 18,243 0.258 0.909 -1 6.063 
ln(Imports)i,j,t-1 18,243 19.401 3.041 0 26.901 
ln(Real exchange rate)i,j,t-1 18,243 0.500 3.674 -11.073 10.795 
Importer GDP growthi,t/t-3 18,243 0.120 0.091 -0.155 0.433 
Exporter GDP growthj,t/t-3 18,243 0.113 0.095 -0.437 0.532 
Note: Import growth has been winsorized at the 95th percentile. 
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Table 3: Step 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     ln(1+PTAs negotiation) and ln(1+PTAs implemented) 
         PTAs negotiationi,k,t -0.240*** -0.291*** -0.208*** -0.292*** -0.310*** -0.380*** -0.250** -0.381*** 
 (0.070) (0.071) (0.074) (0.072) (0.108) (0.107) (0.116) (0.109) 
PTAs implementedi,k,t -0.425*** -0.416*** -0.413*** -0.410*** -0.619*** -0.577*** -0.569*** -0.578*** 
 (0.106) (0.116) (0.108) (0.113) (0.159) (0.171) (0.164) (0.173) 
Import growthi,j,t/t-1  0.083  0.101  0.084  0.105 
  (0.066)  (0.071)  (0.065)  (0.071) 
ln(Imports)i,j,t-1  0.491***  0.590***  0.499***  0.606*** 
  (0.045)  (0.069)  (0.045)  (0.069) 
ln(Real exchange rate)i,j,t-1  0.757***  0.755***  0.743***  0.739*** 
  (0.127)  (0.136)  (0.127)  (0.136) 
Importer GDP growthi,t/t-3  -0.186  -0.595  -0.225  -0.648 
  (0.480)  (0.496)  (0.475)  (0.492) 
Exporter GDP growthj,t/t-3  -0.032  -0.073  -0.037  -0.086 
  (0.375)  (0.385)  (0.375)  (0.387) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Importer FE  Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
Exporter FE  Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
Dyad FE  No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 28,144 18,243 11,653 9,142 28,144 18,243 11,653 9,142 
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.29 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.29 0.21 0.23 
Notes: The dependent variable is the count of AD measures introduced by country i against country j in year t. PTAs are included in the regressors if they affect at least 10% 
of the import volume of the importing country. The table reports the estimated coefficients of negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered at country-pair level; 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Step 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   ln(1+negotiation) and 
ln(1+implemented)  
     FTAs negotiationi,k,t -0.145** -0.155** -0.162 -0.185 
 (0.068) (0.073) (0.104) (0.112) 
CUs negotiationi,k,t -0.678*** -0.674*** -0.897*** -0.894*** 
 (0.170) (0.177) (0.248) (0.258) 
FTAs implementedi,k,t -0.511*** -0.511*** -0.827*** -0.844*** 
 (0.134) (0.132) (0.201) (0.205) 
FTAs implementedi,k,t x Import growthi,j,t/t-1 0.036 0.100 0.032 0.147 
 (0.174) (0.122) (0.279) (0.210) 
CUs implementedi,k,t -0.280* -0.340** -0.215 -0.333 
 (0.152) (0.150) (0.254) (0.257) 
CUs implementedi,k,t x Import growthi,j,t/t-1 0.427*** 0.429*** 0.622*** 0.637*** 
 (0.109) (0.113) (0.163) (0.170) 
Import growthi,j,t/t-1 -0.012 0.001 -0.013 -0.000 
 (0.082) (0.080) (0.084) (0.082) 
ln(Imports)i,j,t-1 0.478*** 0.558*** 0.482*** 0.567*** 
 (0.043) (0.067) (0.043) (0.067) 
ln(Real exchange rate)i,j,t-1 0.775*** 0.771*** 0.759*** 0.749*** 
 (0.129) (0.140) (0.130) (0.140) 
Importer GDP growthi,t/t-3 -0.002 -0.450 0.058 -0.402 
 (0.508) (0.534) (0.507) (0.535) 
Exporter GDP growthj,t/t-3 -0.166 -0.200 -0.185 -0.231 
 (0.385) (0.391) (0.389) (0.396) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Importer FE  Yes No Yes No 
Exporter FE  Yes No Yes No 
Dyad FE  No Yes No Yes 
Observations 18,243 9,142 18,243 9,142 
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.24 0.29 0.24 
Notes: The dependent variable is the count of AD measures introduced by country i against country j in year t. PTAs 
are included in the regressors if they affect at least 10% of the import volume of the importing country. The table 
reports the estimated coefficients of negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered at country-pair level; 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 5: Predicted counts of Step 1 
 (1) (2) 
   C(PTAs negotiation=0, PTAs implemented=0) 0.470*** 0.441*** 
 (0.055) (0.047) 
C(PTAs negotiation=1, PTAs implemented=0) 0.351*** 0.338*** 
 (0.033) (0.029) 
C(PTAs negotiation=0, PTAs implemented=1) 0.312*** 0.295*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
C(PTAs negotiation=1, PTAs implemented=1) 0.233*** 0.226*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) 
Observations 9,142 9,142 
Notes: The table reports average predicted counts for columns (4) and (8) of Table 3 conditioning on the variables in 
the C(•) function (in Table 5) taking on the specified values while the other variables are taking their actual values. 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 6: Predicted counts of Step 2 
 (1) (2) 
Role of FTAs:   
C(FTAs negotiation=0, FTAs implemented=0) 0.424*** 0.415*** 
 (0.044) (0.038) 
C(FTAs negotiation=1, FTAs implemented=0) 0.363*** 0.365*** 
 (0.033) (0.030) 
C(FTAs negotiation=0, FTAs implemented=1, imp. growth=25th pct) 0.249*** 0.226*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) 
C(FTAs negotiation=0, FTAs implemented=1, imp. growth=75th pct) 0.264*** 0.240*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) 
C(FTAs negotiation=1, FTAs implemented=1, imp. growth=25th pct) 0.214*** 0.199*** 
 (0.017) (0.020) 
C(FTAs negotiation=1, FTAs implemented=1, imp. growth=75th pct) 0.226*** 0.211*** 
 (0.018) (0.021) 
Role of CUs:   
C(CUs negotiation=0, CUs implemented=0) 0.359*** 0.342*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) 
C(CUs negotiation=1, CUs implemented=0) 0.183*** 0.184*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
C(CUs negotiation=0, CUs implemented=1, imp. growth=25th pct) 0.249*** 0.264*** 
 (0.021) (0.030) 
C(CUs negotiation=0, CUs implemented=1, imp. growth=75th pct) 0.287*** 0.305*** 
 (0.024) (0.034) 
C(CUs negotiation=1, CUs implemented=1, imp. growth=25th pct) 0.127*** 0.142*** 
 (0.028) (0.035) 
C(CUs negotiation=1, CUs implemented=1, imp. growth=75th pct) 0.146*** 0.164*** 
 (0.032) (0.041) 
Observations 9,142 9,142 
Notes: The table reports average predicted counts for columns (2) and (4) of Table 4 conditioning on the variables in 
the C(•) function (in Table 6) taking on the specified values while the other variables are taking their actual values. ***, 
**, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 7: Robustness: threshold for included PTAs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  ln(1+X)  ln(1+X) 
     PTAs negotiationi,k,t -0.161*** -0.233**   
 (0.062) (0.102)   
PTAs implementedi,k,t -0.400*** -0.622***   
 (0.107) (0.164)   
FTAs negotiationi,k,t   -0.010 0.067 
   (0.061) (0.105) 
CUs negotiationi,k,t   -0.626*** -0.834*** 
   (0.160) (0.274) 
FTAs implementedi,k,t   -0.474*** -0.807*** 
   (0.118) (0.171) 
FTAs implementedi,k,t x Import growthi,j,t/t-1   0.150 0.290 
   (0.095) (0.207) 
CUs implementedi,k,t   -0.391*** -0.516 
   (0.151) (0.363) 
CUs implementedi,k,t x Import growth i,j,t/t-1   0.288** 0.513** 
   (0.134) (0.217) 
Import growthi,j,t/t-1 0.116* 0.114* -0.001 -0.029 
 (0.067) (0.068) (0.087) (0.099) 
ln(Imports)i,j,t-1 0.624*** 0.630*** 0.595*** 0.597*** 
 (0.061) (0.064) (0.057) (0.061) 
ln(Real exchange rate)i,j,t-1 0.777*** 0.755*** 0.741*** 0.714*** 
 (0.133) (0.134) (0.137) (0.140) 
Importer GDP growthi,t/t-3 -0.608 -0.566 -0.529 -0.461 
 (0.497) (0.500) (0.534) (0.543) 
Exporter GDP growthj,t/t-3 -0.071 -0.090 -0.137 -0.142 
 (0.375) (0.382) (0.382) (0.389) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dyad FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,142 9,142 9,142 9,142 
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 
Notes: The dependent variable is the count of AD measures introduced by country i against country j in year t. PTAs 
are included in the regressors if they affect at least 5% of the import volume of the importing country. The table 
reports the estimated coefficients of negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered at country-pair 
level; ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Robustness: included country pairs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  ln(1+X)  ln(1+X) 
     PTAs negotiationi,k,t -0.113* -0.202**   
 (0.060) (0.092)   
PTAs implementedi,k,t -0.143** -0.293**   
 (0.073) (0.133)   
FTAs negotiationi,k,t   -0.002 -0.020 
   (0.056) (0.092) 
CUs negotiationi,k,t   -0.576*** -0.788*** 
   (0.162) (0.238) 
FTAs implementedi,k,t   -0.165** -0.404*** 
   (0.080) (0.146) 
FTAs implementedi,k,t x Import growthi,j,t/t-1   0.051 0.079 
   (0.084) (0.173) 
CUs implementedi,k,t   -0.159 -0.165 
   (0.119) (0.217) 
CUs implementedi,k,t x Import growth i,j,t/t-1   0.329*** 0.490*** 
   (0.111) (0.167) 
Import growthi,j,t/t-1 0.131** 0.131** 0.066 0.060 
 (0.064) (0.065) (0.071) (0.072) 
ln(Imports)i,j,t-1 0.594*** 0.598*** 0.576*** 0.576*** 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.062) 
ln(Real exchange rate)i,j,t-1 0.725*** 0.723*** 0.745*** 0.739*** 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.128) (0.128) 
Importer GDP growthi,t/t-3 -0.506 -0.537 -0.408 -0.343 
 (0.449) (0.448) (0.478) (0.480) 
Exporter GDP growthj,t/t-3 0.120 0.115 0.007 -0.011 
 (0.358) (0.358) (0.361) (0.363) 
PTA dummyi,j,t -0.332** -0.327** -0.334** -0.323** 
 (0.134) (0.133) (0.134) (0.134) 
Negotiation dummyi,j,t 0.114 0.117 0.122 0.136 
 (0.126) (0.127) (0.128) (0.129) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dyad FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,715 11,715 11,715 11,715 
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 
Notes: The dependent variable is the count of AD measures introduced by country i against country j in year t. PTAs 
are included in the regressors if they affect at least 10% of the import volume of the importing country. The table 
reports the estimated coefficients of negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered at country-pair level; 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table A1: PTAs included in the analysis when using a 10% threshold 
PTA name Importing countries 
included in the analysis 
Type of 
PTA 
Still under 
negotiation 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia FTA no 
ASEAN-China China, Indonesia FTA no 
ASEAN-India Indonesia FTA no 
ASEAN-Japan Indonesia FTA no 
ASEAN-South Korea Indonesia FTA no 
Australia-China Australia FTA no 
China-New Zealand New Zealand FTA no 
China-South Korea China, South Korea FTA no 
CUSFTA Canada, USA FTA no 
EU15 enlargement EU CU no 
EU25 enlargement EU CU no 
EU-Canada Canada FTA yes 
EU-Columbia-Peru-Ecuador Peru FTA no 
EU-India India FTA yes 
EU-SADC EPA South Africa FTA no 
EU-South Africa South Africa FTA no 
EU-Turkey Turkey CU no 
Japan-South Korea South Korea FTA yes 
MERCOSUR Argentina, Brazil CU no 
NAFTA Canada, Mexico, USA FTA no 
Peru-China Peru FTA no 
TTIP EU, USA FTA yes 
US-Australia Australia FTA no 
US-Peru Peru FTA no 
Note: Agreements are classified as still under negotiation based on their status at the end of 2015. 
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Table A2: Sample period for included importing countries 
Country First year Last year 
Argentina 1989 2015 
Australia 1989 2015 
Brazil 1988 2015 
Canada 1980 2015 
China 1997 2015 
European Union 1980 2015 
India 1992 2015 
Indonesia 1996 2015 
Mexico 1987 2015 
New Zealand 1982 2015 
Peru 1992 2015 
South Africa 1992 2015 
South Korea 1986 2015 
Turkey 1989 2015 
USA 1980 2015 
 
